Manlio Fossati, University of St Andrews: “Responsibility and external constraint in the myth of Er”
One of the most memorable passages included in the myth of Er is the image of the souls choosing the life in which they will be reincarnated. Memorable though it is, this image along with the ensuing narrative poses the question of whether the ante-natal choice of life absolves souls from responsibility for their actions. In my paper I will argue that indications contained in the myth and the notion of soul embraced in the Republic show that the process of life-choosing limits the responsibility of the souls in certain respects, but without denying it completely. I will point out that among the three elements involved in a soul’s choice of life (617e1-3), the lot influences a soul at the moment of its choice of a future life, the life pattern plays a role in shaping its incarnated life, while the daimon is of only marginal importance.
In discussing the role played by the lot, I will propose that it exerts some influence on the souls’ choice of life but it remains incapable of definitely determining it. I will argue that the importance of the lot is diminished by the emphasis placed on virtue by the priest of Lachesis at 617e3-4 and Socrates’ reassurance that a satisfactory choice can be made even by a soul that chooses last (619b3- 6). I will show these statements are corroborated by Er’s observation that the number of lives available for choice is higher than that of the souls choosing (618a2). I will show that the double mention of the lot as a factor influencing the choice of the souls (619d5-7, 619d7-e5) is not sufficiently strong evidence for denying that souls can exert freedom. Neither of the two passages presents the lot as the exclusive factor involved in the choice and the second one explicitly mentions the practice of philosophy as an element that increases the likelihood of appropriate choice.
When evaluating the degree of freedom exerted by souls after reincarnation, I will argue that the choice of a particular life pattern has a limited influence on a soul’s moral decisions. I will point out that a life pattern entails a set of external circumstances but not a fixed disposition of the soul. I will show that the passage 577d1-5 signals that the word disposition, when referred to the soul, indicates the relation among its rational part, spirit and appetite. I will consider the description of the metamorphosis of the democratic man into a tyrant, evidence that the relation among the three parts of the soul is fluid and can be influenced by external factors. I will also show that lines 441e7-442a2 clearly indicate that the disposition of the soul is influenced also by education, which strengthens the leadership of the rational part. Finally, I will conclude that Socrates’ exhortation to identify the external factors that positively influence the composition of the soul (618b7-e3) signals that incarnated souls retain a degree of responsibility for their choices.
Sergio da Costa Oggioni, Universidade Federal do ABC: “A dialética no diálogo Parmênides de Platão à luz de Hegel”
O objetivo deste trabalho é compreender como a dialética possibilita Platão a apresentar uma solução à aporia de Parmênides. Ao propor que tudo o que podemos afirmar sobre o ser é que ele é, Parmênides torna duvidosa a possibilidade de um discurso racional a respeito do mesmo. Para solucionar a aporia eleata, Platão recorre a um método distinto do de Parmênides, é preciso abandonar o método eleata de deduzir suas verdades a partir de uma verdade autoevidente e adotar um novo método que possa rever as hipóteses caso elas nos levem a uma aporia. Com isso, Platão passa a buscar a verdade através de uma dialética. A contradição, que antes não possuía nenhum valor, ganha uma função dentro de um método que a partir de opostos obtém a unidade. Este aspecto do diálogo Parmênides desperta um interesse particular em Hegel, pois nele já estaria presente a verdadeira dialética. Hegel considera que a dialética platônica tem como objetivo dissolver o particular e produzir o universal, ou seja, seu objetivo é refutar as opiniões e afirmar apenas o que constitui a “ideia”. Platão busca dissolver as representações finitas, provocar na consciência a necessidade da ciência e levá-la ao que há de mais universal no homem. Desta forma, pretendo apresentar um estudo sobre a dialética platônica presente no Parmênides com auxílio da leitura que Hegel fez sobre o mesmo.
Ovidiu Gacea, Université de Grenoble, Alpes: “Platon et le « dialogue intérieur » : une réponse ancienne pour une nouvelle conception du soi”
Le fait d’interroger, aussi bien en philosophie qu’en neurosciences, l’idée qu’il y aurait quelque chose comme le soi nous met à la recherche d’un nouveau modèle de compréhension de l’être humain. Nous pensons surtout à Platon. Sa conception, néanmoins, ne semble pas avoir d’équivalent dans le débat actuel, débat qui témoigne d’une tension spécifiquement moderne entre orientation subjectiviste et orientation anti-subjectiviste. L’« étrangeté » du modèle grec peut pourtant s’avérer productive, précisément parce qu’il ne connaît pas cette tension.
La description platonicienne de la pensée en termes de « dialogue intérieur et silencieux de l’âme avec elle-même » dans deux dialogues tardifs, le Théétète et le Sophiste, peut être conçue comme une forme de réponse aux questions actuelles sur le statut du soi. La culture grecque propose un modèle du « soi en dialogue » (Gill, 1996). Plus encore, ce modèle exclut également : l’idée d’ « expérience subjective », la notion d’ « intériorité » et d’accès privilégié à un tel « monde intérieur ». Que reste-t-il dès lors de la conception platonicienne du soi?
Nous nous proposons, dans un premier temps, de mener un travail de déconstruction de la notion de « dialogue intérieur » afin de montrer que par intériorité Platon ne comprenait pas la même chose que nous, c’est-à-dire le locus de l’expérience subjective et l’idée d’un monde intérieur qui peut s’objectiver et, ainsi, se soumettre à l’analyse introspective. La distinction entre « monde intérieur » et « monde extérieur » n’avait aucun sens pour les Grecs (Burnyeat, 1982). Parler, pour les Grecs, de la conception d’une pensée spirituelle et intérieure qui serait source et fondement de la parole proférée ou qui ordonnerait la réalité selon ses catégories apparaît, au moins, comme une preuve d’anachronisme.
Cette distinction semble émerger avec Augustin et avec sa transformation de la notion de « dialogue intérieur » en « verbe intérieur ». Pour Augustin, la source de la vérité se trouve à l’intérieur de l’âme, dans un vrai monde (le seul véritable) d’états subjectifs. Ce mouvement vers l’intérieur se radicalise avec Descartes et contribue ainsi de façon décisive à l’assimilation de l’intérieur – jugé comme supérieur et essentiel – à l’intelligible ; et de l’extérieur au sensible – jugé inférieur et contingent.
C’est donc cette notion d’intériorité, marquée par une connotation mentaliste et totalement étrangère à la culture grecque, qui sert de filtre dans l’interprétation de la conception platonicienne de la pensée, conception qui se situe néanmoins au-delà des dichotomies intérieur-extérieur, intelligible-sensible, spirituel-matériel. Nous montrerons ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, ce que Platon entend par « dialogue intérieur » et nous essayerons de mettre cette description en rapport avec sa conception du « soi en dialogue », c’est-à-dire de l’individu conçu comme « soi » et « non-soi » à la fois. Nous serons donc face à un modèle paradoxal qui ne met pas au centre l’aspect phénoménal et subjectif de l’expérience, sans « extérioriser » pour autant le soi – le comprendre comme orienté vers le dehors et non pas vers le dedans – ou le concevoir comme ni-délimité-ni-unifié.
Nestor Reinoldo Müller, Universidade Federal de São Carlos: “Inflexões semânticas da palavra Anámnesis no Diálogo Mênon de Platão” (via Skype)
É bem conhecida a importância da palavra anámnesis no Mênon, onde aparece pela primeira vez a chamada Teoria da Reminiscência, conforme a cronologia mais aceita dos diálogos platônicos. São dezesseis as ocorrências dessa palavra naquele texto, seja em forma de substantivo ou de verbo. Já uma primeira leitura permite reconhecer que seu significado sofre algumas modulações, desde a memória corriqueira de uma informação adquirida no intervalo de alguns meses até a recuperação de um conhecimento proveniente de outras vidas. O objetivo desta comunicação é analisar essa deriva semântica, que obedece a três grandes grupos. Nas primeiras dez páginas do diálogo (70a1 – 79e7), anámnesis refere-se a uma lembrança comum: o personagem Mênon escutou várias vezes o ensinamento de Górgias sobre a natureza da virtude e é instado pelo personagem Sócrates a rememora-lo. Mais tarde (80d5 – e5), Mênon dispara contra Sócrates o paradoxo que este mesmo havia engatilhado por sua insistência em dizer que nada sabe sobre o tema em pauta, e Sócrates responde ao desafio com a mencionada Teoria da Reminiscência (81a1 – e2). Ali o termo anámnesis passa a denotar lembranças que tomam a forma de aprendizados e de inspirações para a investigação, e se caracterizam pela origem situada além do âmbito desta vida. Mas na demonstração da sua Teoria (81e3 – 86c3) – a célebre conversa com o menino-escravo – Sócrates passa a usar a palavra anámnesis para caracterizar o raciocínio que o escravo é capaz de realizar, acompanhando as precisas indicações oferecidas pelas perguntas socráticas. Este terceiro significado é confirmado por uma clara definição presente na antepenúltima página do diálogo (97e5 – 98a8). Além de acompanhar o percurso dessas inflexões, a comunicação irá analisar as relações entre elas e discutir algumas de suas implicações para nossa compreensão da Teoria da Reminiscência.
Vasilis Politis, Trinity College Dublin: “Plato’s Sophist and the distinction between the question ‘What is there?’ and the question ‘What is being?’”
Plato is notoriously keen on ti esti questions, and we are familiar from the early dialogues with a range of phenomena of which he asks this type of question: ‘What is courage?’ from the Laches, ‘What is piety?’ from the Euthyphro, and many more. To this well-familiar range of ti esti questions we have good reason to add the question ‘What is knowledge?’ from the Theaetetus. Did Plato also, and in an analogous way, ask the question ‘What is being?’? Did he not only ask this question, but set it against the question ‘What is there?’?; just as, in the early dialogues, the question ‘What is F?’ is set against the question ‘What things are F?’, and, in the Theaetetus, the question ‘What is knowledge?’ is set against the question ‘What things are examples of knowing?’ Further, did he not only distinguish the question ‘What is being?’ from the question ‘What is there?’, but claim that the former question is in some way prior to the latter; just as, in the early dialogues as well as the Theaetetus, he claims a priority of the question ‘What is F?’ over the question ‘What things are F?’? If so, what kind of priority does he intend of the question ‘What is being?’ over the question ‘What is there?’?
Fernando Santoro, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro: “Platão Dionisíaco”
As personagens do Banquete de Platão são faces de gêneros literários, isto é assente. Mais do que isso, também são máscaras de gêneros sapienciais tradicionais ou inovadores acerca do amor. Platão os dispõe num mútuo desafio entre amigos, convivial e filosófico. Além do mais, no Banquete, como diz Sócrates, celebra-se não apenas Eros e Afrodite, mas também Dioniso (177e). Quais são as máscaras de Dioniso no Banquete de Platão? O discurso de Aristófanes é um discurso cosmogônico, segundo um modelo de teogonia de inspiração órfica, encontrável na comédia As Aves, do Aristófanes real. Ele introduz uma lição de hermenêutica dos mitos, primeira etapa do rito dionisíaco. O discurso de Diotima, sob a máscara dialética e ascética da filosofia, pretende iniciar aos mistérios. Segundo passo do rito, que faz saltar do particular para o universal. O discurso confessional de Alcibíades, que desmascara-se e desmascara Sócrates, é uma revelação epóptica para iniciados ou então a profanação de um mistério. Terceira etapa que traz a verdade profunda que só se diz quando se é tomado pela loucura ou embriaguez do amor. Cosmogonia, iniciação e revelação do mistério erótico de Dioniso.
Willie Costello, Stanford University: “Forms and the method of hypothesis throughout the Phaedo”
Much has been said about the method of hypothesis in the Phaedo; indeed, there is now general agreement about how, in broad outline, the method is supposed to work (cf., e.g., Benson (2015), Bailey (2005), Kanayama (2000), van Eck (1994), Gentzler (1991)). However, the existing scholarship on the Phaedo’s method of hypothesis has focused exclusively on the argument at 100a–107a (the “Final Argument”). This makes sense, insofar as Socrates describes his hypothetical method at the start of this argument, and employs this method in its remainder. Yet such exclusive focus on the Final Argument overlooks the fact that Socrates employs his hypothetical method throughout the dialogue: that every argument in the Phaedo is in fact a hypothetical argument; that some of them are even described as such; and that several of them even begin from the very same hypothesis – that “there are Forms”.
Thee immediate aim of this paper is to bring attention to these other, hitherto neglected instances of the hypothetical method within the Phaedo. The upshot of this new perspective is twofold: First, these other instances of hypothetical arguments can be used to clarify how the method of hypothesis is supposed to work. Second, and more significantly, the arguments beginning from the hypothesis that there are Forms can be used to clarify the conception of Forms which Socrates is working with in the dialogue – and suggest, as I argue, that this conception is much weaker than is typically assumed.
The paper proceeds as follows: I begin by presenting the basic structure of hypothetical arguments, according to Socrates’ remarks at 100a. This structure consists of three connected claims: an agreed-upon hypothesis, from which is derived some intermediary claim, from which we arrive at some desired conclusion. Next, I show that this tripartite structure is found in all of the Phaedo’s arguments, not just the Final Argument. Further, I note that this evidence indicates that the relationship between a hypothesis and its intermediary claim should be understood as one of “coherence” or “positive recommendation” (thus confirming the analysis of Gentzler (1991) et al.).
I then shift focus to those arguments based on the hypothesis that there are Forms (viz., the Recollection Argument (74a–77a), the Affinity Argument (78b–80b), and Socrates’ Defense (65b–66a)). I claim that, by a ending to the consequences which are variously derived from this hypothesis, we can reconstruct the content of the initial hypothesis itself – and that when we do so we find that Socrates is in fact working from a fairly minimal conception of Forms. More specifically, what we find is that, throughout the Phaedo, Socrates argues (and does not assume) that Forms are imperceptible, eternal, unchanging, etc. And this shows that what Socrates is assuming, in hypothesizing that “there are Forms”, is not the existence of so-called “Platonic Forms” (which would already be recognized to have such features), but rather something much more metaphysically innocent, from which he believes the full-fledged conception of Platonic Forms can be shown to derive.
Whitney Schwab, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “Plato’s value problem”
At the end of the Meno, the character Meno asks Socrates why epistêmê is more highly valued than alêthês doxa. A certain interpretation of this question, on which Meno is asking why knowledge is more highly valued than true belief, has recently received much attention in contemporary epistemology, being called ‘the value problem’ for knowledge. However, as is well known, many interpreters of Plato have argued that epistêmê more closely approximates the cognitive state of understanding than it does the cognitive state of knowledge, and this modified interpretation would lead to a different value problem than contemporary philosophers have focused on.
While I agree that epistêmê is better thought of in terms of understanding than in terms of knowledge, in this paper I examine the state Meno contrasts with epistêmê, namely alêthês doxa. In contemporary philosophical contexts, when someone contrasts true belief with some superior cognitive state, he or she is almost universally taken to mean mere true belief, that is, belief that falls short of knowledge. So, even on the modified understanding of Meno’s question, he is still taken to be asking why understanding is more highly valued than belief states that do not count as knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. I contend that by ‘alêthês doxa’ Meno means to include cognitive states that count as knowledge—that is, beliefs that are justi ed, warranted, well-grounded, reliably formed, and so on. So, on my interpretation, the question Meno is asking (and, hence, what I call ‘Plato’s Value Problem’) is ‘why is understanding more highly valued than knowledge?’
Not only does understanding Meno’s question in this way help us to represent Plato’s conceptual schema more accurately, I argue that it leads to different interpretations of key parts of the dialogue from those standard in the literature. In particular, I think that the famous Road to Larissa example must be understood in a different way than it is normally taken. Most interpreters, influenced by thinking in terms of mere true belief, assume that the person with alêthês doxa must be someone who has formed his or her belief in a shoddy manner: say by merely guessing how to get to Larissa. This, I argue, leads to a misunderstanding of the intended contrast between alêthês doxa and epistêmê. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, understanding the contrast to be between understanding and knowledge, rather than between understanding and mere true belief, leads to a different, and philosophically promising, interpretation of the sense in which epistêmê is more permanent than alêthês doxa (which is the feature of epistêmê Socrates points to as accounting for its greater relative value).